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Footnotes 
• Portions of this article are excerpted from or otherwise based on
the author’s book PREVENTIVE LAW AND PROBLEM SOLVING:
LAWYERING FOR THE FUTURE (Vandeplas Publishing, 2009) (here-
after “LAWYERING FOR THE FUTURE”).
1. For fine descriptions and analyses of Problem Solving Courts, see
SUSAN GOLDBERG, JUDGING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A PROBLEM-SOLV-
ING APPROACH (National Judicial Institute of Canada, 2005) (here-
after “JUDGING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY”); DAVID B. WEXLER AND
BRUCE J. WINICK, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (2003) (hereafter “JUDGING IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY”).
2. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER AND BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(1996); JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra, note 1.
3. See Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive
Law Movement,” 6. PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 1 (2006). 
4. See LAWYERING FOR THE FUTURE at 205–225.
5. This example is discussed Id., at 33–36.
State court systems have done much in recent years todeepen their “problem-solving” qualities.  Across thecountry, courts have adopted court-annexed mediation
programs and developed a variety of specialty courts tailored to
drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, mental health,
homelessness, and sexual offenders.1 These innovations have
broadened the scope in which legal problems are understood
and deepened the level of engagement between legal system
personnel and claimants/defendants.  They have spawned
thoughtful reflections by judges and lawyers about the impact
and effectiveness of legal institutions and methods as exempli-
fied by the Therapeutic Jurisprudence2 and Comprehensive
Law3 movements.
“Preventive Law” could be considered the next frontier for
American courts.  Although Preventive Law is making steady
progress within the practicing Bar, implementation of its con-
cepts are especially challenging for the judiciary.  Yet its simple
truths are enduringly appealing for every part of the legal sys-
tem.  Why should the pain and expense of an injury be endured
if it could have been averted?  It is almost always easier and
cheaper to prevent a dispute than to fight over it.  This essay
explores the prospects and obstacles for general-jurisdiction
judges to participate in the movement toward preventing legal
problems as well as in resolving them well and creatively.  
The essay begins by connecting problems with procedures
generally, describing the importance of a good fit.  Part II sug-
gests, however, that in recent years, legal problems have taken
on new shapes that strain the seams and buttons of traditional
adjudication.  ADR and Problem-Solving Courts may have
evolved precisely as a way of grafting new procedures onto
changing legal problems.  Part III identifies how Preventive Law
differs from Problem Solving, and some rule-of-law obstacles
that confront judges who may wish to employ stronger preven-
tive methods.  Finally, the essay explores how judges might par-
ticipate in Preventive Law within their traditional powers and
jurisdictional authority. 
I.  THE CO-EVOLUTION OF PROBLEMS AND
PROCEDURES 
Problem Solving and Preventive Law have much in common.
They share the premise that the demands made by problems
shape the procedures that evolve to solve those problems.4
Both ways of thinking, in other words, assume that procedures
develop their particular methods so as to respond to the fea-
tures of particular sorts of problems.  Ideally, for every human
problem, a procedure has been developed that will provide an
effective, efficient, and just resolution of that problem.
Here is an example of a procedure that is nicely adapted to a
problem.5 Most sporting events face the initial question of
whom should begin the action, and whom should respond to
that starting initiative.  Which team, in other words, should
kick off and which team should receive?  One procedure for
addressing this problem is broadly accepted:  an umpire flips a
coin at the center of the field, while being observed by repre-
sentatives of both teams.  The coin-flip is effective because
although the procedure produces only a crude outcome (either
Team A or Team B kicks off), that is all the problem demands.
However humble, the procedure of flipping a coin adequately
addresses the demands of this simple problem.  It is also effi-
cient:  it requires little time and is available even in sand-lot
games by children.  It is fair, just, and trustworthy because it
uses a transparently generated random selection that cannot
readily be manipulated.
Flipping a coin works well for starting athletic events, but
obviously is not suitable for all problems nor all problems that
require a solution with a clear selection between two opposing
possibilities.  The choice of electing the President of the United
States demonstrates the limitations of the appropriateness of
the coin-flip procedure.  Although (realistically) choosing a
President is a binary choice between the Republican and the
Democratic party candidates, no one would imagine a coin-flip
to be appropriate in addressing this particular problem.  We
instead rely on another breakthrough in the invention of pro-
cedures to address problems:  Democracy.  
Most adjudicated legal problems are resolved by a binary
judgment between plaintiff/prosecutor and defendant.  In that
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respect we could employ a coin-flip.  But of course we do not
do so because just as in the election of our leaders, we value the
quality of information and deliberation that a coin-flip cannot
supply.  For problems traditionally set before our courts, the
rules of civil procedure have evolved so as to resolve those
problems accurately, fairly, and transparently.  
Traditional litigation is an especially elaborate and refined
procedure.  It addresses an immensely broad swath of human
problems and is a foundation for the rule of law.  Like democ-
racy, the rule of law is a seminal achievement in the history of
human governance.  And judges are its primary guardians.  To
my mind, procedural experiments in addressing legal problems
must always heed this cautionary warning:  they must not com-
promise the operation or social trust in the rule of law. 6
Also to my mind, the developments in ADR and Problem-
Solving-Courts have not undermined the general-jurisdiction
courts.  If anything, both of these developments have arguably
advanced the rule of law.  I shall return to this touchstone issue
at the end of the essay, but for now I will simply assert that
recent procedural innovations respond appropriately to a
changing mix of problems presented to the legal system.
II.  PROBLEMS PRESENTED TO COURTS:  
THEY AIN’T WHAT THEY USED TO BE
The legal system has been expanding its capacity and flexi-
bility in responding to human problems and has done so in ways
that have preserved the public trust in the rule of law.  ADR and
Problem-Solving Courts are characterized by stronger reliance
on consent of the parties than on state power; by informal nar-
ratives for problem-identification and information rather than
formal pleadings and rules of evidence; by understanding prob-
lems and solutions within broader contexts than those suggested
by a strict application of legal rules; by more orientation toward
workable relationships for the future than exclusive concern for
the etiology of past injuries; and by remedies that depend more
on personal accountability than on transfer payments or incar-
ceration.7 All of these qualities arguably cope better with the
demands of many (not all) of the sorts of problems that increas-
ingly make their way to the legal system.
A.  Changing Attributes of Legal Problems
Make no mistake: more and more, we are asking our judges
to resolve problems that are harder and harder to resolve.  As I
elaborate below,8 legal problems are increasingly volatile, novel,
intimate, or recurring.  Or, they require complex choices among
regulatory alternatives.  All of these properties make a problem
harder to decide, especially with the methods of traditional liti-
gation.  That is because traditional courtroom procedures
evolved in response to the problems of simpler times and
places:  transactions in agrarian or gradually industrializing
societies in which customary beliefs were stronger and more
widely held.  ADR and Problem-Solving Courts are being devel-
oped and accepted because they have procedural features that
cope better with these structurally challenging problems that
increasingly characterize modern life. 
1.  VOLATILITY AND NOVELTY
More contemporary problems are volatile or novel simply
because the rate of social, economic, and technological change
continues to accelerate.  To demonstrate this, imagine the sorts
of legal problems that are likely to be more prevalent 20 years
from now.  How should, or can, the judicial branch respond to
legal issues raised by global warming; severe misallocations of
water; natural resource depletion; severe immigration pressures
on national boundaries and human trafficking; genetic manipu-
lation; terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction; the
effects of the steady disintegration of extended and even
nuclear families; and the demands for access to effective and
affordable health care, especially among baby boomers who by
then will be entering frail old age?  
Where the background conditions to a problem are volatile,
a judgment rendered based upon the conditions prevailing at
any given moment is like characterizing a video according to a
few still-shots out of the moving context.  Capturing the truth
out of any given moment risks failing to see recurring patterns.
Worse, it risks failing to perceive how the justness in applying
legal rules might fluctuate from party to party.  And yet the
methods of traditional adjudication are better designed for dis-
crete transactions, for snapshots rather than dynamic environ-
ments.  Further, where issues are novel, the legal rules that
ground the authority of the court may be sketchy, vague, or
even absent.  
The historical genius of the common law is its ability to pro-
pose and test proposed solutions to changing circumstances
through a flexible but guiding stare decisis. Yet it is sometimes
difficult for the common law to keep pace.  Of course, modern
legislative and executive branch regulations carry much of the
load in dealing with newly emerging problems.  Nonetheless,
the judiciary sees its share of these swirling problems, and they
may be without precedent. 
2.  INTIMACY
More legal problems also now seem intimate, i.e., embedded
in long-standing basic human relationships.  Many components
contribute to this:  the decline of the family harmony doctrine,
higher divorce rates, the rise of more complex standards for
awarding child custody, and an increased willingness within
our culture to address problems such as sexual abuse, domestic
violence, and elder abuse.  
These problems are more difficult on a number of dimen-
6. The tension between Problem-Solving Courts and “core judicial
values–certainty, reliability, impartiality and fairness” is identified
and well explored by Greg Berman and John Feinblatt in Problem-
Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, originally published in 23 LAW AND
POL’Y #2, excerpted in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 2,
at 81–85.  As the authors caution, these core values “have been
safeguarded over many generations largely through a reliance on
tradition and precedent.  As a result, efforts to introduce new ways
of doing justice are always subjected to careful scrutiny.”  Id., at
81.
7. See generally, LAWYERING FOR THE FUTURE at 252–278.
8. The changing nature of legal problems is discussed Id., at 254—
256.
9. Id., at 223–225.
10. See generally Thomas D. Barton, The Common Law and Its
Substitutes: The Allocation of Social Problems Among Alternative
Decisional Institutions, 63 N.C. L. REV. 519 (1985). 
11. See LAWYERING FOR THE FUTURE at 177-180
sions.  First, it is harder to take in appropriate evidence on these
problems because the witnesses may be underage or intimi-
dated.  Further, evidentiary relevance and materiality are prob-
lematic because of the give-and-take and emotional episodes
that occur within most intimate relationships.  Unlike judging
criminal episodes or singular tortious interactions, judging the
relative health or pathology of relationships is unreliable when
the judge has evidence of only a tiny percentage of the interac-
tions in a long-term or dense relationship.  Finally, often the
task at hand in resolving these problems is to create an envi-
ronment for moving forward.  Judges are being asked to man-
age relationships for the future, entailing predictions and inter-
ventions that are far more within the normal realm of psycholo-
gists than judges. 
3.  CHRONIC OR RECURRING PROBLEMS
Although I lack data, my impression is also that more prob-
lems are being presented to the judiciary that are recurring.
Examples would be criminality and civil-disorder problems
stemming from drug or alcohol addiction, mental illness, gang
membership, homelessness, or sexual predation.  Obviously
illegal behaviors are being performed, and these are the direct
prompts for legal system involvement.  But the people engaging
in these illicit activities are doing so for reasons that are particu-
larly resistant to traditional legal remedies.  The courthouse and
jailhouse become revolving doors for these folks to enter and
leave repeatedly.  Addressing the underlying causes of these
problems is a very different enterprise than traditional legal
judging.  Once again they are more in the realm of therapy,
social work, or perhaps urban planning.
4. PLANNING DECISIONS: PROBLEMS OF THE
REGULATORY STATE
The mention of urban planning leads me to speculate on one
final category that may be increasing in trial court dockets.  These
are problems that stem from the initiatives of the modern regula-
tory state. Examples would include the siting of a new highway,
or preservation of wetlands and open spaces, or the planned allo-
cation of medical resources.  These problems are especially tricky
for the judiciary because they cannot easily be reduced to yes or
no answers about liability.  The nature of the problems demands
a processing of information and a form of resolution that do not
correspond to structures traditionally available in adjudication.
Planning decisions entail multiple variables that play against one
another to produce multiple possible outcomes.9 Problems like
this are better suited to the expertise of planners or the decen-
tralized valuations of the market.10
B.  Changing Attributes of People Who Have Legal
Problems
The paragraphs above explain the emergence of ADR and
Problem-Solving Courts by focusing on the attributes of the
problems modernly presented to the courts.  The same phe-
nomenon could be explained instead by looking at the people
who have those problems, and asking whether the underlying
assumptions of traditional adjudication will lead to just out-
comes for those people.11
1.  RATIONALITY
For example, the law assumes in its resolution of problems
that the people before them are rational in their choices and abil-
ity to comport with the law.  The law has special provisions for
those who are mentally ill, but the underlying compulsions of
drug or alcohol addiction also impair rationality.  The wide-
spread acceptance of drug courts reflects the law’s attempt to
fashion a procedure that better matches these challenges.  But
what about problems held by people who are involved in
intensely emotional relationships like sexual intimacy or parent-
ing?  Do they display the detached rationality that is necessary
for informed choice?  Family courts may represent an institu-
tional response to these situated human qualities, as well as to
particular legal aspects of marital dissolution and child custody.  
2.  SEPARATION
As it addresses problems and pronounces remedies, the law
also assumes that people can be separated one from another.
That is, the law assumes that people are free to move from
whatever troubled relationships may have brought them to
court.  These assumptions about the dissolution of social ties
are not always warranted, however, and if so the legal judgment
or remedy may be neither effective nor just.  This is another rea-
son why child custody issues, for example, are so difficult.  The
court is pronouncing a legal separation of one (or both) parents
from some or all aspects of the child’s life.  Emotionally, how-
ever, separation is not so easy.  This same limitation on separa-
tion also accounts for some of the difficulty of domestic vio-
lence cases.  Separating the parties through a restraining order
is a primary tool of what the law has to offer, but it may not be
what either party really wants.  Or, more commonly, separation
may not be economically feasible.  
In yet other cases, pronouncing a separation may paradoxi-
cally undermine the reasons why people sought legal help for
the problem.  Immigration and asylum issues may be examples,
or problems that arise within religious organizations or within
indigenous ethnic groups.  The parties may be seeking more
peaceable affairs within a relationship—a relationship of loca-
tion or a relationship of religious or tribal belonging—rather
than a severing of that relationship.  But the traditional methods
of adjudication are not easily suited to supply that.  They lack
the proper techniques for getting at the truth within the rela-
tionship, or the power to order or supervise an effective remedy.
III.  HOW PREVENTIVE LAW AND PROBLEM SOLVING
DIVERGE
A.  Moving Earlier in the Life-Cycle of a Legal Problem 
For the sorts of problems described within Part II above, the
techniques of ADR and Problem-Solving Courts may be effec-
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tive and appropriate.  These innovations differ from traditional
litigation in how issues are defined, information gathered, deci-
sions reached, and remedies effected.12 Even though they rely
less on legal rules and employ different understanding of the
truth and how it is achieved, neither ADR nor Problem-Solving
Courts seem to conflict with the meaning or strength of the rule
of law.  Preventive Law shares much with Problem Solving, but
what separates the two helps to explain why acting preventively
is easier for practicing lawyers than for sitting judges. 
Preventive Law seeks to address risks before they become
problems.  Preventive Law differs from Problem Solving, in
other words, by intervening earlier in the life cycle of a prob-
lem.13 To do so, the preventive thinker must understand the
underlying causes of problems.  Those causes are often complex
and subtle, emerging from systemic interactions of personal,
social, and nonsocial environments.  Ironically, the more com-
plex the system that generates a risk, the more alternative ini-
tiatives might be available to disrupt that potential pathology.14
A biological analogy may be helpful.  If a cold virus has
infected Person A, then Person B who is in close contact with
Person A is at risk of sneezing in the near future.  If Person B
recognizes the risk in time, however, preventive measures may
be taken that will stave off actual illness.  Even in this simple
example, however, a variety of interventions could be effective.
Person B could ask that Person A cover his or her mouth when
coughing.  Person B could wear a mask, or simply move out of
range of Person A.  Person B could take steps to build up his or
her immune system.
For the preventive thinker, every human problem is nested
originally in a set of interacting connections.  The deeper the
understanding of the various social, financial, civic, organiza-
tional, moral, or physical connections, the earlier and easier
prevention becomes.  Prevention depends on knowledge.  The
mechanisms of risks must be understood, the seriousness of the
risks must be assessed, and alternative possible interventions
must be generated and attempted.  
The entire preventive inquiry and intervention is done ahead
of any injury.  This is crucial for general-jurisdiction judges and
the extent to which they can act preventively because for legal
problems, effective prevention would precede any claim that a
legal rule has been violated. In that respect, Preventive Law
diverges from ADR and Problem-Solving Courts.  ADR assumes
the existence of a dispute, which typically erupts out of a claim
of the breach of some legal duty.  Problem-Solving Courts simi-
larly presuppose that a problem exists.  Indeed, the problem
may have long persisted before the defendant cooperates with a
Problem-Solving Court.
This is not to say that ADR mechanisms and Problem-Solving
Courts do not prevent problems.  They do.15 Frequently, they
address an immediate injury, claim, or criminal behavior in such
a way that the problem does not recur.16 Problem-Solving
Courts especially make a conscious effort to address the deeper
causes of the addiction or violence.17 These courts then attempt
to open up opportunities to break the destructive cycle in which
the defendant seems trapped.  The court may put the defendant
in touch with social services, therapists, and potential employ-
ers.  The court will monitor progress (or backsliding) by peri-
odic reappearances to the court.
But something—a proper legal claim or criminal arrest—
must initially prompt the courts to exercise their jurisdiction.  In
both court-annexed mediation and Problem-Solving Courts, the
state has properly invoked its power.  Thereafter, the matter is
diverted to an alternative format that almost invariably is accom-
panied by some form of consent by the defendant or parties.  
The traditional aim of Preventive Law, by contrast, is to gain
some ability to examine and intervene in an environment at the
risk stage before any matter is brought before the court.  That is
what Louis M. Brown, the father of Preventive Law, referred to
as getting the matter while the facts were still “hot.”  By that he
meant that the environment was still manipulatable, so as to
avert the path that seems to be leading to actual injury.  When
the facts grow cold, generally following actual injury, the range
of possible alternatives shrink.  They shrink in part because at
this stage the damage has been done:  a cognizable legal claim
has been created.
To some extent, facts are always cold by the time they make
it to a court.  How could a court otherwise exercise jurisdic-
tion?  If the facts are still hot, a “case or controversy” may not
yet have arisen.  And if Preventive Law is effective, it never will.  
Preventive Law is traditionally practiced within a law office
as a lawyer counsels a client based on far-ranging conversations
between lawyer and client.18 When those conversations begin,
neither the lawyer nor the client may have any idea about any
particular legal risk.  Indeed, there may be none.  Brown advo-
cated “periodic legal check-ups” between lawyer and client in
which the lawyer would regularly be brought up to date with all
of the client’s affairs.  Much like regular medical check-ups, no
risk may be detected.  The inquiries of the physician and
accompanying routine blood tests may turn up no areas for
concern.  Or, they may identify early warning signs for which
preventive measures would be warranted.  The point, of course,
is to have the risk identified as early as possible so that treat-
ment can be less intrusive and less expensive.
Preventive Law thus stresses the need for early consultation
between lawyer and client.  But it also emphasizes the impor-
tance for the lawyer to inquire as broadly as possible about the
client’s affairs.   The lawyer, by reason of training and experi-
ence, can spot legal risks far ahead of when they may be per-
ceived by the client.  But to be effective in fashioning sugges-
tions for interventions that may avert the injury, the lawyer’s
knowledge about the client’s larger environments must be
broad.  The preventive lawyer must understand legal risks not
in isolation, but as part of a broader system of connections in
the client’s world. 
12. For a comprehensive comparison of traditional versus therapeutic
or problem-solving courts court procedures and officers, see the
chart at page 5 of JUDGING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 1.
13. See LAWYERING FOR THE FUTURE at 49–54.
14. See Id., at 55–78.
15. See JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 1, at 9.
16. Berman and Feinblatt, supra note 6, as quoted Id., at 79.
17. Id., at 18
18. LOUIS M. BROWN AND EDWARD A. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS:
MATERIALS ON A NON-ADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS 49–52 (1976).
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19. But see Berman and Feinblatt, supra note 6, as quoted in JUDGING IN
A THERAPEUTIC KEY, at 82.
20. One significant step, although related only indirectly to preven-
tion, could be to consider the courtroom demeanor eloquently
described in JUDGING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 1.
21. See LAWYERING FOR THE FUTURE at 297–299.
22. The author is indebted to retired Federal Magistrate James F. Stiven
for his most helpful consultation on all of listed examples.  Several
of the alternative possibilities explored in these examples were
supplied and developed by Judge Stiven.
B.  Obstacles to Preventive Actions by General-
Jurisdiction Judges
This traditional practice of Preventive Law is not readily
available to a general-jurisdiction judge.  Judges in Problem-
Solving Courts have, through consent of the parties, assumed a
broad vision over the problem, its resolution, and the preven-
tion of its recurrence.  But the original legal jurisdiction of these
judges under state or federal constitutional authority is not in
question.  If we set aside Problem-Solving Courts and focus on
general-jurisdiction judges, the scope of preventive practices is
not so broad.
First, as suggested above, traditional general jurisdiction
courts react to claims that summon their authority.  That
authority is based on plausible legal rights, as stated in a com-
plaint.  Until a legally cognizable claim is stated—which most
often must be based on some actual or imminent injury—
courts may not act.  This contrasts with lawyers who, in the pri-
vate confines of their law offices, may freely counsel the client.
The lawyer may investigate broadly and recommend a variety of
legal and nonlegal preventive measures.  In so doing, the pri-
vate lawyer may communicate directly with potential adver-
saries or their attorneys. 
A judge who became involved in a matter before the proper
lodging of a claim about legal rights or duties would challenge
several assumptions about the rule of law.  First, a foundational
principle of the rule of law is the limitation on state authority in
making people answer to courts.  That nexus is established
through the idea of due process.  How can a general-jurisdiction
judge become legitimately engaged at the stage of legal risk
rather than legal injury?  The private lawyer is not an agent of
the state; the judge is clearly part of its embodiment.   
Second, Preventive Law is done best through conversations
that are broad as well as early.  The lawyer seeks to understand
the client’s affairs as fully as possible.  But unfocused inquiries
by a general-jurisdiction judge could further violate traditional
understandings of the relationship between citizen and state.
One important function of formal pleadings is to narrow legal
inquiries as well as provide notice of the proceedings.  Tying a
judge’s authority to pleadings avoids Star Chamber-style inter-
rogations. 
Relatedly, the adversarial system is still employed within
general-jurisdiction courts.  Unless a matter is diverted from
that system, the articulation of legal issues and the application
of legal rules are still premised on the arguments of opposing
counsel.  The inquisitorial processes of civil-law judges can cre-
ate a strong rule of law.  But that is simply a different judicial
model from the Anglo-American heritage.
A final challenge to the rule of law stems from the premise
that Preventive Law can intervene in multiple ways in a broadly
envisioned system so as to disrupt pathological interactions or
to enhance the connections to work better toward a client’s
goals.  Where public issues become involved, expansive proac-
tive measures would not only challenge the court’s supervisory
capabilities, but also raise division-of-powers issues about the
relationship of the judicial branch of government to the legisla-
tive and executive branches.19
IV.  HOW MAY A GENERAL-JURISDICTION JUDGE
PARTICIPATE IN PREVENTIVE LAW? 
The goals of Preventive Law have always been worthy.  And
as our society becomes more sophisticated about the complex
systems in which risks are born and injuries erupt, Preventive
Law is an idea whose time has come.  How, therefore, may a
general-jurisdiction judge participate?  Convinced by the logic
of prevention, how can judges act in ways that address risks
before they cause injury?20
Some powers that are traditionally available to judges may be
used for preventive purposes.  This assumes, of course, that a
case is properly before the judge.  But once that happens, the
judge has inherent powers that can help to uncover the precur-
sors of additional problems.  The judge can discover and act
upon some sources of risk, friction, overreaching, and poor
communication.  The judge has powers of investigation, refer-
ral of issues for public prosecution or to Bar authorities, sanc-
tioning attorneys, dismissal of unworthy claims, and persuasive
authority in judicial-chambers settlement conferences.  These
powers may not work as easily or comprehensively as those
available to the private lawyer counseling a client, but they
nonetheless could be helpful and can be exercised well within
the rule of law.
Acting preventively may not always feel comfortable, how-
ever, even where exercised under powers that are legitimately
available to judges.  In the examples below, consider whether
you would feel authorized, and if so, whether you would feel at
ease in taking the actions suggested.21
Example 1:22
A judge is hearing the fifth example of the same sort
of tort claim; each claim was brought by unrelated plain-
tiffs, but each claim was brought against the same indus-
trial defendant.  In each case, the plaintiff has lost, and
the judge comes to believe it is because the individual
plaintiffs will not be able to muster expert witnesses of
the same caliber as those testifying on behalf of the
defendant.  Would it be appropriate for the judge to order
the appointment of an independent neutral expert?  
Now suppose that the judge were to attempt to make
such an appointment, but several potential experts con-
tacted had to refuse on conflict-of-interest grounds:
They had previous connections with the defendant or
had been contacted about the case already by the defen-
dant. Would it be appropriate for the judge to order an
120 Court Review - Volume 45 
23. The adversarial mentality runs deep within our culture, writes
David B. Wexler, in Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Culture of
Critique, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 263 (1999), as cited in William
G. Schma, Judging for the New Millenium, 37 CT. REV. 4, 6 (2000).
investigation of the terms and practices by which
research money has been funneled by the defendant over
the past three years into academic institutions whose
employees are now testifying for the defendant or unable
to act as a neutral expert for the court?
Example 2:  
In a private-nuisance case, mediation has been tried
and failed.  The case is scheduled for trial.  When the
judge reads the papers and is sitting in a pretrial settle-
ment conference, the judge gets the strong impression
that this is a grudge match:  that the parties are being vin-
dictive and self-destructive; that it is not about the plain-
tiff needing a remedy, but instead about each party want-
ing to secure a pronouncement that the other person is
wrong.  Suppose, however, that the plaintiff’s claim has
some technical legal merit.  Is it appropriate for the judge
in that instance to declare, off-the-record in chambers,
that either the parties come to some compromise, or the
judge will dismiss the complaint?  Short of that, is it
appropriate for the judge to schedule multiple settlement
conferences?  Delay the trial?
Example 3:
During a medical-malpractice trial, the judge comes to
the suspicion that the defendant, a physician who was
never called to testify, was impaired due to drug abuse.
Before the trial is concluded, a settlement is reached that
the judge is asked to approve.  The consequences of the
settlement are that the physician will remain in practice.
Would it be appropriate for the judge to order a physical
or mental examination of the defendant to determine
drug dependency?  Could the judge instead require the
defendant, as a condition to the judge approving the set-
tlement, to provide a sealed/confidential certification
from a medical board that the defendant is fit to practice
medicine?
Example 4: 
Suppose that a plaintiff has been pursuing a civil
action for sexual discrimination by her medium-sized
business employer on a disparate-treatment theory.  The
jury awards damages to the plaintiff.  In hearing the tes-
timony, however, the judge believes that the work envi-
ronment is hostile even though that theory was never
pursued by the plaintiff’s attorney.  Would it be appropri-
ate for the judge, following entry of judgment for money
damages in favor of the plaintiff, to further order that
every employee of the defendant undergo gender-sensi-
tivity training on the theory that the risk of future sexual
discriminations should be prevented?
Most of us, judges or lawyers, will reach a point of discom-
fort in considering the examples.23 Most would see the worth
of preventive action and the legitimacy of the judge’s proposed
action.  And yet we know that the stakes are high.  The rule of
law is a treasure, and judges have a vital role in its maintenance.  
Every society must construct some device for simultane-
ously advancing two vital social functions:  facilitating human
interaction, and protecting people from one another.  Both
functions are required for social existence.  Historically, how-
ever, the two functions have been seen as conflicting:  the more
dense the human interaction, the greater the threat to self-pro-
tection.  This may be conceived as the fundamental social
dilemma.  Our society has chosen to balance or manage these
two functions through the rule of law:  people are empowered
to interact freely without constraints of caste or inherited role.
But they are strongly protected in those interactions by being
equipped with individual rights, which can be vindicated
through carefully constructed and constrained legal rules and
judicial determinations.
If we broaden the contexts by which the legal system evalu-
ates human problems and accord greater discretion in general-
jurisdiction judges to frame, investigate, and remedy problems,
will the protective function of law be compromised?  Or the
human-interaction function?  Or both? 
But could such a broadening of our understanding of the
general judicial role actually strengthen both functions, as
arguably ADR and Problem-Solving Courts have done?  It
seems a possibility.  Preventive Law imagines that human rela-
tionships inside as well as outside of the official legal system
can, as they deepen or intensify, augment human protection.  As
Preventive Law presents itself to the judiciary alongside
Problem Solving, these questions are worthy, even if as yet
unanswerable.
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